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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
course as opposed to man-made drainage means can have a substantial
effect on the legal rights involved. It is interesting to note that the John-
son court, in dictum, endorsed the "capacity of the stream" rule men-
tioned earlier. While no major changes appeared in this area, more
litigation will arise from drainage problems and perhaps in the year 1961
some major decisions will be forthcoming.
JOHN H. WILHARM, JR.
SALES
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
The certificate of title is the thing... but not always. That appears
to be the state of the law in Ohio as indicated by the cases decided dur-
ing 1960.
In Young v. Emanaker,1 plaintiff had instituted an action for damages
sustained to his automobile. At the time the damages occurred, plaintiff
not only had possession of the automobile and an assignment of the
seller's interest therein, but had, as well, made application for the issuance
of a certificate of title. The Butler County Court of Common Pleas,
following the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Brewer v. De-
Cant,' held that plaintiff was not entitled to maintain an action for dam-
ages to an automobile purchased by him, where at the time such damages
were sustained he did not have a certificate of title to the automobile in
his name. This decision is dearly consistent with the mandate of section
4505.04 of the Revised Code, which provides in part that:
No person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof,
whether such owner is a manufacturer, importer, dealer, or otherwise,
shall acquire any right, title, claim, or interest in or to said motor vehicle
until such person has had issued to him a certificate of tide to said
motor vehicle....
Not clearly consistent with the foregoing section are two cases3 de-
cided by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, in which that court
considered the same issues as were presented to the court of common
1. 164 N.E.2d 473 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
2. 167 Ohio St. 411, 149 N.E.2d 166 (1959). "Under the Ohio Certificate of Title Act,
a change in ownership of an automobile is not consummated until a certificate of title is issued
in the name of the purchaser." Id. at syllabus 2.
3. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local 1099, 110 Ohio App. 341, 165
N.E.2d 435 (1960); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Kozoil, 165 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
See also discussion in 12 WEST. REs. L. REv. 630 (1961).
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pleas in Mutual Finance Company v. Meade,4 discussed in last year's
survey.
5
In Mutual Finance Company v. Municipal Employees Union Local
1099," plaintiff had attempted to replevy from defendant certain auto-
mobiles purchased by defendant from an automobile dealer who had
failed to cause certificates of title to the automobiles to be issued in the
name of defendant. Unknown to defendant at the time of the sale,
plaintiff held a manufacturer's statement of origin to secure a wholesale
or "floor plan" mortgage executed by the dealer for each of the auto-
mobiles in question. Plaintiff subsequently accepted the assignment of
a retail mortgage executed by defendant to the dealer, and, in so
doing, remitted to the dealer the funds secured by the retail mortgage
instead of applying them in payment of the wholesale mortgage. There
had been imposed upon the dealer by the terms of the wholesale
mortgage the duty to hold in trust all funds received upon the retail sale
of each automobile and remit them to plaintiff. Upon the dealer's failure
to do so, plaintiff instituted the action in replevin against defendant, and
the dealer was adjudicated a bankrupt.
The court of common pleas7 had held for defendant on the ground
that (1) the "floor plan rule"' of estoppel had not been terminated by
section 4505.13 of the Code; (2) that defendant was justified in relying
upon the apparent authority to sell which had been vested in the dealer by
plaintiff; and (3) that plaintiff was guilty of constructive fraud by failing
to retain the funds secured by the retail mortgage and in failing to apply
the same in payment of the wholesale mortgage.
In affirming the judgment of the lower court, the court of appeals
held that: (1) no estoppel could operate against plaintiff in favor of
defendant for the reason that section 4505.13 of the Revised Code
creates an exception to the "floor plan rule"; (2) no relationship of
agency or joint venture existed between plaintiff and the automobile
dealer; (3) there was no actual or constructive fraud on the part of plain-
tiff; (4) defendant was presumed to have known that in the absence of
the issuance of a certificate of title, it could acquire no interest in the auto-
mobiles, nor could any court in law or equity recognize such an interest;
(5) defendant was presumed to have known that the automobile dealer
would be unable to provide defendant with the certificates of title unless
4. 161 N.E.2d 561 (Ohio C.P. 1959), affd sub wom. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Em-
ployees Union Local 1099, 110 Ohio App. 341, 165 N.E.2d 435 (1960).
5. Berns, Sales, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WEST. Ri1S. L. REv. 417 (1960).
6. 110 Ohio App. 341, 165 N.E.2d 435 (1960).
7. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Meade, 161 N.B2d 561 (Ohio CP. 1959).
8. Under the "floor plan rule," an owner who has placed for sale an automobile in a retail
dealer's showroom is estopped to deny the tide of an innocent purchaser who bought the
automobile in the regular course of trade and without actual notice of the floor plan mortgage.
1961]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
he had possession of the manufacturer's statements of origin; (6) plain-
tiff was negligent in paying to the dealer the funds which plaintiff should
have applied toward the liquidation of the wholesale mortgage, and, as
such,
the loss must fall on Mutual under the well known equitable rule that
where one of two persons must suffer by the fraud of a third person
whom each trusted, the one who first trusted the third person and placed
in his hands the means which enabled him to commit the wrong must
suffer the loss?
The second of the cases decided by the Court of Appeals for Cuya-
hoga County was Mutual Finance Company v. Kozoil.' The facts in
that case were, with one major exception, substantially the same as those
set forth above. In Kozoil, the defendant paid the price of the auto-
mobile purchased by him from the dealer in cash. Thus, plaintiff was
not in the inconsistent position of holding both a wholesale and a retail
mortgage on the automobile sold to defendant, nor was there ever in the
hands of plaintiff any funds which it might have applied toward the
liquidation of the wholesale mortgage.
In affirming the decision of the common pleas court in favor of
defendant, the court of appeals, one judge dissenting,1 held as follows:
(1) that the "floor plan rule" of estoppel had not been terminated by
section 4505.13; (2) that the automobile dealer was acting as agent
for plaintiff; (3) that plaintiff was a party to the active fraud practiced
on defendant by the automobile dealer.
The Mutual Finance Company cases indicate the pressing need for
revision of the Certificate of Tide Act. However, it is suggested that
such revision is properly the function of the legislature rather than that
of the courts.
BREACH OF WARRANTY
In Allen v. Grafton,"2 the Ohio Supreme Court was called upon to
decide whether the presence of a piece of oyster shell approximately
one and one-fifth inches by four-fifths of an inch contained in a serving of
six fried oysters would justify a legal conclusion that the serving of
fried oysters constituted "adulterated" food, within the meaning of section
3715.59 of the Revised Code, or that such a serving constituted food not
"reasonably fit for" eating within the meaning of section 1315.16."3
9. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local 1099, 110 Ohio App. 341, 353, 165
N.E.2d 435, 443 (1960).
10. 165 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960), motion to certify granted, No. 36654, Ohio
Sup. Ct. (Nov. 2, 1960).
11. Judge Kovachy, who wrote the opinion for the court in the Employees Union case, dis-
sented for the reasons set forth there.
12. 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960).
13. UNIFoRM SALES Acr § 15.
[June
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1960
Plaintiff had been served the fried oysters in defendant's restaurant,
and as a result thereof had suffered a puncture of his small intestine,
requiring surgical removal of the oyster shell. His petition was framed
to allege a breach of implied warranty as to fitness for use,'" and to allege
a violation under the Pure Food and Drug Act.5 A demurrer to the
petition was sustained by the trial court, and upon plaintiff's failure to
plead further, he suffered final judgment against him. The Court of
Appeals for Hamilton County reversed the judgment of the trial court
and an appeal was taken to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The portions of the Pure Food and Drug Act relevant to the court's
decision are contained in sections 3715.52 and 3715.59 of the Revised
Code. The former section provides in part that:
The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited:
(A) The manufacture, sale, or delivery, holding or offering for
sale of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or mis-
branded....
The latter section states in part as follows:
Food is adulterated within the meaning of sections 3715.01 and
3715.52 to 3715.72, inclusive, of the Revised Code, if:
(A) (1) It bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious sub-
stance which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance
is not an added substance such food shall not be considered adulterated
under this clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not
ordinarily render it injurious to health .... (Emphasis added.)
In a four-to-three decision, the supreme court held as a matter of law
that the presence of the one piece of oyster shell would not justify the con-
clusion that the serving of oysters was "adulterated" food under the
definition of that term set forth in section 3715.59, or that the serving
was not "reasonably fit for" eating within the meaning of section
1315.16 of the Code.
The basis of the court's decision is found in the following excerpt
from its opinion:
In our opinion, the possible presence of a piece of oyster shell in or
attached to an oyster is so well known to anyone who eats oysters that
we can say as a matter of law that one who eats oysters can reasonably
anticipate and guard against eating such a piece of shell, especially where
it is as big a piece as the one described in plaintiff's petition.'8
The minority of the court' viewed the issues raised under the Pure
14. OHIo REv. CODE § 1315.16(A).
15. OHIO REV. CODE ch. 3715.
16. Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 259, 164 N.E.2d 167, 174 (1960).
17. Id. at 259, 164 N.X.2d at 175 (dissenting opinion).
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Food and Drug Act'8 and under the Uniform Sales Act 9 as questions
which properly should be determined by the jury.
In Kennedy v. General Beauty Products, Incorporated"° the Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County made clear its position as to the liability
of a manufacturer to a subpurchaser under the theory of implied war-
ranty of fitness. The court held that it was bound by the supreme court
case of Wood v. General Electric Company,2 which stated in part that:
no action may be maintained [by a subpurchaser] against a manu-
facturer for injury, based upon implied warranty of fitness... 22
The court stated that Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Company"
did not modify the decision in Wood. Not mentioned in the court's
opinion was a decision by the same court of appeals in Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Incorporated,4 which heretofore had been inter-
preted by many practicing attorneys as an acceptance by the court of
the now famous dictum in the Rogers case,25 wherein the supreme court
stated that it would be willing to re-examine its holding in the Wood
case.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
In Friedman Finance Company v. Stolzenburg,2 plaintiff had ob-
tained judgment against the defendant on a cognovit note of which he
was the co-maker. In defendant's action to vacate the judgment, he
tendered an answer alleging that the note was secured by a chattel
mortgage on an automobile which had been repossessed and sold by
plaintiff without defendant's knowledge and without the ten-day notice
to defendant, required by Revised Code section 1319.07. The Columbus
Municipal Court sustained a demurrer to the answer, but the Court of
Appeals for Franklin County reversed, stating that, given a liberal con-
struction, the answer stated a defense.
Although not specifically stated in the court's opinion, it appears
that the defendant was not the owner of the automobile which had been
repossessed and sold by plaintiff. Apparently, the automobile had been
owned by the maker of the note upon which defendant was co-maker.
18. OHIo REv. CODE ch. 3715.
19. OHio REV. CODE ch. 1315.
20. 167 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
21. 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
22. Id. at syllabus 2.
23. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
24. 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
25. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 249, 147 N.E.2d 612, 616
(1958) (dictum).
26. 110 Ohio App. 211, 167 N.E.2d 533 (1959).
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